This paper presents empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991) , with an application to banks. In particular, banking markets remain concentrated regardless of market size. Given an asymmetric oligopoly where dominant and fringe firms coexist, the number of dominant banks remains unchanged with market size, with only the number of fringe banks varying across markets. Such structure is sustained by competitive investments in quality, with the level of quality increasing with market size and dominant banks providing higher quality than fringe banks. The analysis has implications for antitrust policy.
analysis. Moreover, it is an attempt to analyze and measure service quality in banking.
The results suggest that the industrial structure of banking markets can be explained by the endogenous sunk cost model. In particular, there exists a lower bound to concentration, as banking markets remain concentrated across all market sizes. The basic structure of banking markets is characterized by the coexistence of a few, large dominant banks -defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in a given metropolitan market -with a number of smaller, local banks which constitute a fringe. Given this concentrated structure of asymmetric oligopoly, the equilibrium number of dominant banks remains unchanged with market size, with only the number of fringe banks varying across markets. Moreover, this market structure appears to be sustained by competitive investments in quality, such as branch networks, branch staffing and geographic diversification (with some indirect evidence suggesting branding and advertising). In particular, the level of bank quality increases with market size, and dominant banks are found to provide a higher level of quality than fringe banks. Furthermore, banks do not appear to carve out areas within the relevant geographic banking market, but rather compete with each other closely. In terms of the product market, however, dominant and fringe banks appear to focus on a few different sectors.
The analysis has some direct implications for antitrust policy. The introduction of quality investment in the study of competition alters certain relationships between the number of firms, market concentration and conduct that have been believed to exist by the bank regulatory authorities. 3 Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board 4 focus on market concentration to determine whether a contemplated merger might cause antitrust concerns [see Amel, 1997 ]. Yet a relevant question might be whether the new bank would become a dominant firm or instead be part of the fringe, as well as considerations regarding market size and quality provision. For example, will the formation of the new firm imply the reduction of the number of dominant firms in the market to one? If the postmerger firm becomes dominant, will it have competition from other dominant firms? Will the new firm join the fringe instead? Will the merger increase the ATM network available to consumers? This paper also sheds light on the empirical finding that larger banks charge significantly higher fees than smaller banks. 5 The reasons usually speculated for this occurrence include locational differences between larger and smaller banks, the better service quality of bigger banks, and the fact that larger organizations tend to depend less on retail customers for funds. The findings here indicate that dominant firms, which tend to be large banks, do charge higher fees yet invest more in quality. While it might be presumed that the direct cause of quality is bank size, it appears that quality is the result of banks' competitive investment in endogenous sunk costs, which gives rise to barriers to entry and allows for market structure nonfragmentation with increases in market size. This, in turn, allows those banks that invest more in quality to hold large market shares and become big banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework.
Section 3 describes the data and provides a discussion of endogenous sunk costs in banking.
Section 4 provides supporting evidence for the various predictions of the endogenous sunk cost model in terms of banking markets. Section 5 provides an analysis of competition inside banking markets, while 6 analyzes some of the implications for antitrust policy. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Theory of market structure and quality
The work of Sutton provides a framework for analyzing market structure as market size grows, and how this relates to quality investments, whenever quality requires that firms incur fixed costs. This theory guides the empirical analysis in this paper. Central to it is the notion that some sunk costs are incurred with a view to enhancing consumers' willingnessto-pay for the firm's products, and as a result represent a firm's choice variable (therefore are "endogenous"). The key to the theory is that while exogenous costs have a fixed magnitude irrespective of market size, endogenous sunk costs vary as market size changes (though both are fixed with respect to output). Drawing a distinction between these sunk costs, the model makes robust predictions, across a broad class of competition models, about the relationship between market concentration and market size, as well as the equilibrium investment in sunk costs and market size whenever costs have endogenous components.
In particular, exogenous sunk costs, on the one hand, are defined as those setup costs or fixed outlays associated with acquiring a single plant of minimum efficient scale that do not vary with market size. Endogenous sunk costs, or quality investments whose magnitude is chosen by the firm, on the other hand, are defined as costs that can change a firm's demand, such as R & D, advertising and direct service upgrades. The central focus of the theory then lies in unraveling the way in which these two elements of sunk costs, exogenous and endogenous, interact with one another to determine the equilibrium market structure in an industry.
For the case of exogenous sunk costs, the central prediction of the theory is that an increase in market size relative to setup costs may lead to indefinitely low levels of market concentration. 6 In the case of endogenous sunk costs, however, this property breaks down.
Here the model predicts that markets remain concentrated regardless of market size, as competition among firms leads to escalating investment in quality. In particular, the conclusions of the model are:
(1) Market structure does not fragment as market size increases, and therefore there exists a lower bound to the equilibrium level of concentration in the industry, no matter how large the market becomes;
(2) firms engage in a competitive escalation of investment in quality as market size increases, creating barriers to entry; (3) the equilibrium number of firms in the market remains approximately the same regardless of market size.
These conclusions are robust to a very broad class of oligopoly models with various degrees of product differentiation, toughness of price competition and strategic symme- 6 In an industry where there are only fixed setup costs (exogenous costs) and the product is homogeneous, the equilibrium number of firms should increase with market size, while market concentration should asymptote to zero. In a differentiated product setting, however, the existence of only exogenous components to sunk costs leads to multiple equilibria, ranging from concentrated to fragmented market structures. try/asymmetry. For a detailed study of these models, see Sutton (1991) . 7 3 The banking industry: data and background
Data sources
The data are based on a cross-section for 1999 8 Given the format of the data, there are several possible levels of aggregation that could be used as the unit of analysis. My approach is to define the relevant geographic banking market at the level of the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), a geographic unit defined by the U.S. Census Bureau that consists of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities, that comprise one or more counties. This market definition is supported by surveys of consumers and businesses as well as the bulk of the empirical banking literature. 9 7 Note that endogenous sunk costs are interpreted broadly. The finding that markets remain concentrated as they grow in size is in itself an indication that there is strategic interaction in the industry. This is important as it provides an explanation for market concentration that is not the usual efficiency/economies of scale one. What this strategic interaction is (e.g. quality per se, advertising, first-mover advantage) depends on the application. Here lies what is one of the great contributions of Sutton's work. 8 The data are for the second quarter, which is chosen here because some the variables of interest are reported only then. 9 For a detailed discussion on relevant geographic market definition, see Dick (2002) and the references therein.
Basic characteristics of banking markets
In the U.S. there are about 330 MSA banking markets, which represent 83 percent of total U.S. dollar deposits. These markets are largely independent. While some banks in the U.S. operate in various markets, the bulk of banks have presence in only one or two markets. 10 Even for those banks that operate in more than one market, usually demand conditions, and to some extent cost factors, are independent across markets. The average number of banks in an MSA is 20, with as few as two banks in Lewiston-Auburn, ME, and with as many as 255 in Chicago, IL. Table 1 shows the distribution of MSA markets in terms of the number of banks in the market. On average, an MSA has a total of 140 branches. Adjusting by population, there is an average of 28,000 persons per bank in a given MSA, and 4,600 per branch. As measured by population, the bulk of markets has a size between 100,000 and 500,000 people.
11 Table 2 shows a tabulation of MSAs by various population size categories.
The average Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 12 across MSA markets is around 1900, with market concentration going from as low as 584 in Chicago, IL, which has 255 banks, to almost 7800 in Pittsfield, MA with only three banks. 13 The last column of Table 2 shows the average HHI for each market category by population, while Table 3 depicts some percentiles for the distribution of the HHI across MSA markets (with a standard deviation of 800).
Definitions: dominant and fringe firms
Banking markets usually hold dozens of firms, with great variation in their market shares, and with many of these firms holding only a very small portion of the market. This naturally gives rise to an asymetric oligopoly structure. As a result, it is relevant to make a distinction between the latter and those firms that head the market in terms of market share. For this purpose, I define two types of banking firms that will be used in the analysis: dominant 10 Close to 65 percent of banks operate in a single MSA market. 11 The average MSA size is about 1940 square miles. 12 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a concentration measure constructed as the sum of the squares of the market share of deposits at the local market level. Here, following the practice of the Antitrust Division, I multiply it by a factor of 10,000. 13 The Antitrust Division defines the threshold of a highly concentrated market at 1800. In the case of bank mergers, the Antitrust Division has used a screen of 1800/200 over the past several years. That is, in most cases they will not conduct a full investigation unless in at least one market: (i) the post-merger HHI is at least 1800; (ii) the merger produces a change in the HHI of at least 200. and fringe. Dominant firms are defined as the set of firms that jointly hold over half of the market in terms of deposits. All other firms are fringe firms. For robustness purposes, some other definitions of dominant firms will be used as well later in the analysis. 14 
Market equilibrium
Sutton's theory of market structure applies to markets in equilibrium. In the case of the banking application here, the underlying assumption is that the industry reached an equilibrium in 1999, the year of the analysis. While changes in the industry continued to occur after 1999, the assumption seems reasonable given the tremendous shake-out the sector experienced throughout the last three decades, and in particular in the last ten years, with the introduction of nationwide branching throughout 1994-1997.
15 Figure 1 shows the number of bank mergers per year since 1993. 16 There is an average of 360 mergers per annum, and the number of mergers per year decreases steadily since 1994. Moreover, in 1999, there is a decrease of over 60 percent in the number of mergers from the previous year, and of 70 percent since 1993. 17 14 In particular, two other definitions of dominant firm will be utilized to test whether the results here are sensitive to the definition of dominant firm given in the text: (i) following the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board's definition, a dominant bank is that whose market share is at least twice as large as the share of the second-largest competitor in the market (from the "Casework Manual" for merger proposals of the Federal Reserve Board); and (ii) a dominant firm is that with the largest market share in a market (or alternatively, those with the largest two/three market shares). 15 Regulatory restrictions affecting the ability of banks to diversify geographically have decreased dramatically. Deregulation of unit banking and limited branch banking occurred gradually throughout 1970-1994 in most states. Intrastate branching deregulation began in some states even before the 1970's, while interstate banking started as early as 1978. The process of deregulation of geographic expansion culminated in 1994 with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which permitted nationwide branching as of June 1997. 16 The information on the figure is based on the author's calculation using Banking Holding Company data from the Federal Reserve Board. 17 There are a few caveats to note about this assumption. First, mergers take a while to settle, and mergers do occur in 1999. Second, 1999 is a boom year in the business cycle. However, the market structure in 1993 (in terms of a dominant firm vs. fringe framework) is found to be similar to that of 1999, even though 1993 is not a boom year.
In addition, I find that the firms that have negative (accounting) profits in 1999 and that would likely exit the market, are part of the fringe. As a result, the basic market structure between dominant and fringe firms, documented later in this paper, should not be affected by these developments in the industry in any significant manner.
Endogenous sunk costs in banking
Banks differ greatly in terms of the service quality they provide to their customers. Within a given market, a set of very diverse banks tend to coexist, with some being small, local banks with a few branches, and others large and covering extensive geographic areas, with extensive ATM and branch networks. Banks also differ in terms of the expertise and customer care offered at the branch, the size of branch personnel (which is related to waiting times and the availability of human interaction), financial advise, as well as advertising/brand investments and overall service quality. Endogenous sunk costs, indeed, are expected to be a significant component of total banking costs.
Branch and ATM network
At least some of the branch and ATM installation costs, which affect the bank's demand by attracting new customers, are clearly sunk. Once built, it is hard to recoup the incurred costs. As Radecki et al. (1996) point out, the typical bank branch costs roughly $1 million to build. While a portion of this expense is for equipment, which may be removed and installed elsewhere, most of it covers construction costs. There is also plenty of anecdotal evidence suggesting that branches represent sunk costs. For instance, it represented one of the main arguments for internet banking (The European Internet Report, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, June 1999). 18 While the cost of opening a single branch might not be exactly fixed with respect to output, a bank's overall branch density cost is likely to be largely independent of output levels. 19 In other words, branch and ATM networks should be at least somewhat independent of the number of customers using them in the sense that while a consumer might do most of her banking with a single bank branch, she should still value the convenience of her bank's branch density in the area as well as its ATM network.
20
Even if there is a certain number of customers that a single branch can service, it is 18 See also Sullivan (2001) , based on a survey of banks and their web site services. 19 Sutton's framework, in any event, only requires that marginal costs do not rise too quickly in quality relative to fixed costs. 20 If there is any relationship to output levels, ATMs are likely to be less incremental to costs than branches, though the number of ATMs is likely to be highly correlated to branches.
unlikely to be binding in practice. 21 This is suggested by the popularity in recent years of the in-store or supermarket branch -a full service branch located within a large retail outletas a way to expand customer bases relative to a conventional bank branch [Radecki et al., 1996] . Banks find them attractive not only for cost reduction purposes, but also because they provide access to large flows of potential and existing customers (even though they have smaller staffs than branches): the typical supermarket averages 20,000 to 30,000 customers a week, while the typical bank branch averages just 2,000 to 4,000 weekly customers [Williams, 1997] .
Advertising
Advertising is likely to be another component of sunk costs. Unfortunately, data on bank Advertising outlays might also be highly correlated with the number of bank branches in light of the anecdotal evidence on the greater role of the branch in the bank's advertising decisions. 23 As described by Radecki et al. (1996) , a typical branch has expenses of around $700,000 per year, and while the largest component of this cost is staff compensation, advertising is usually part of it. 21 Output is usually measured in terms of dollar volumes, so the link between branch/ATM costs and the number of customers is even less direct, even if there is a given number of customers that can be served per branch that is also binding. Furthermore, branches are to banks a form of advertising itself. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence about how banks hope to woo customers using their branches, usually with stylish merchandising and customer service. 24 Banks become more visible to consumers through their branches, and in fact, many banks put clocks outside their branches for this reason.
Branding
Branding, which requires fixed cost outlays, is also significant in banking, as a wealth of anecdotal evidence suggests, with banks investing a growing fraction of their resources by engaging in branding campaigns and brand building, as well as the development of inhouse brand marketing departments and branding strategies.
25
Further evidence on the importance of branding is provided by the way banks that merge choose their new brand name, according to bank periodicals. Usually, they choose the name that customers are more familiar with and/or is the strongest brand.
26

Data
The data available do not allow for a complete and direct measure of sunk costs, but some observable bank characteristics should provide an approximation. I use here several bank attributes as quality correlates, 27 including:
(i) a bank's branch density in the MSA market, defined as the number of branches per square mile in the MSA;
(ii) the number of employees per branch;
(iii) the age of the bank, which might proxy for bank experience/branding; (iv) the geographic diversification, measured as the number of states in which the bank operates;
(v) salary per employee.
From the consumer's perspective, more of each one of these attributes is likely to be a good thing. Branch density 28 and geographic diversification are expected to capture the quality of the overall bank network, as they are related to the number of branches in a bank's local markets and should be highly correlated with the ATM network as well. Moreover, while there are no data to measure advertising expenditures, the number of branches might be highly correlated with advertising (either actual dollar outlays and/or under the interpretation of branches as advertising).
The fact that the definitions of dominant and fringe firm are based on deposit market share, while these two quality measures (branch density and geographic diversification) are based on network size, might raise questions about a potential endogeneity when carrying out tests that relate market dominance with quality levels. In particular, is this quality choice driven by a bank's market share? As already mentioned, there is abundant anecdotal evidence suggesting that banks mainly open branches in the hope of attracting new customers, as opposed to responding to the needs of their existing customer base. Branches, in fact, are thought to represent a form of advertising. In particular, a bank might set a high-quality target by offering a number of branches to its consumers in a local market, regardless of its current market share. This bank might then over time see its market share grow as a result of offering a higher quality product.
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Nevertheless, salary per employee is used here as an alternative measure of quality unrelated to bank size. In particular, salary paid to the bank's employees should be correlated to quality, as more highly qualified employees, who might provide better service and expertise, 28 Note that while the number of states in which a bank operates might be restricted by the region's regulatory regime at the time, by 1999 virtually all U.S. states allowed for nationwide branching. Furthermore, the relevant comparison here is cross-sectional and within a market, where all firms are exposed to the same regulatory regime. 29 The alternative of "quality follows size" might still be feasible under certain scenarios of bank entry. For instance, some banks may have become large through first-mover advantage (such as economies of scale, switching costs).
should be more expensive. This could also be correlated with the degree of sophistication of the products offered by the bank.
Another measure of quality, the number of employees per branch, 30 should capture some of the quality provided at the branch, since the larger the branch staff, the lower waiting times should be.
While it is not possible to measure branding directly, bank age 31 is expected to be related to bank experience and its service quality, and/or the importance of branding, since a bank that has been around longer is more likely to have greater prestige and prominence than a younger bank. Expertise can be offered by any bank, but older banks might be particularly good if there is a learning curve. Furthermore, bank age might play a role in light of some theoretical work that suggests that bank entrants face a "lemons" problem derived from their inability to distinguish new borrowers from old borrowers who have been rejected by their previous bank [Dell 'Ariccia et al., 1999; Marquez, 2002] . Older banks might know their customers better and therefore be able to custom fit their products better, therefore providing higher quality to the consumer.
Market structure across market sizes
In this section I provide supporting evidence for the first prediction based on Sutton's endogenous sunk cost model, that there is a minimum level of concentration which is never violated no matter how large the market becomes. Figure 2 shows the relationship between concentration and market size. The former is measured by the HHI, while the latter is measured in terms of the log of market population, where the log is taken to facilitate appreciation of the figure. The figure depicts the HHI observed in markets with as few as 57,000 people and as many as 9 million people. Apparently, there is a lower bound to concentration throughout all market sizes. 32 Indeed, as depicted in the last column of Table   2 , the average HHI shows little variation across various market size categories.
There exists a lower bound to concentration in banking markets, as market structure does not fragment with market size.
Number of firms across market sizes
In this section I provide evidence for the remarkable fact that across all market sizes, the number of dominant banks remains roughly the same. Moreover, a similar dominant firmfringe structure arises in all markets. regardless of market size, the bulk of markets (87 percent of the MSAs) have either two or three dominant firms. Moreover, the correlation between the population and the number of dominant firms in a market is almost zero. This is particularly interesting when contrasted with a model without quality competition but just exogenous fixed costs, where the number of firms should grow with market size given that the number of consumers served per firm should be the same for all markets.
Deposit Lorenz curves 34 provide another way to appreciate the fact that few firms control 32 Similar findings are obtained when using a C4 (sum of largest four market shares) and a C1 (maximum market share) measure of market concentration. Indeed, the C4 measure never goes below 40 percent, showing little variation across markets with a few thousand to millions of people. 33 Ellickson (2001) finds a similar structure for supermarkets. 34 In a market with symmetric firms, the Lorenz curve would actually be a straight line, since all firms most of the market, regardless of the number of firms serving it. Figure 3 shows a Lorenz curve for deposits, where firms are ranked on the x-axis according to their share of market U.S. dollar deposits, while the y-axis shows the cumulative share of deposits. Given the large number of MSA markets, for ease of analysis the figure depicts only six markets, one for each market size category 35 (as defined in Table 2 ). The only apparent difference among the markets is in the length of the tail of the curve, which grows in the number of firms serving the market. Below the 50 percent cumulative share line, markets differ little.
The above description indicates that as markets grow, the number of dominant banks remains virtually unchanged. Naturally, as markets grow in population size, they also tend to expand in the number of banks, yet this growth is only reflected in the length of the tail of the fringe, and does not affect the dominant-firm fringe structure observed in smaller markets. Indeed, the number of firms in a market is highly correlated with population size (0.77), yet the number of dominant firms is almost independent of population and the total number of firms in the market. 
Sunk costs across market sizes
In this section I provide supporting evidence for another expectation about banking markets based on the endogenous sunk cost model: the larger the size of the market, the greater the sunk costs incurred by banks in equilibrium. In the current setup, this prediction can be broken up into two implications: (i) as market size increases, the level of a bank's endogenous sunk costs increases, and (ii) dominant firms incur a higher level of sunk costs than fringe would have the same market share. Thus, the closer the curves get to the y-axis, the more asymmetric, and therefore, the more concentrated the market becomes. 35 The markets chosen in each category are those that are most representative of the Lorenz curve structure within their population size category, both in terms of the number of firms and the market population. However, even if markets were chosen randomly, the figure would be similar. The markets shown in the figure are, in decreasing order by population size: Philadelphia, PA; Fortlauderdale, FL; Vallejo-FairfieldNapa, CA; Hunstville, AL; Punta Gorda, FL, and Pocatello, ID.
firms, while dominant firms in larger markets incur a higher level of sunk costs than dominant firms in smaller markets. Table 5 reports MSA level regressions of quality correlates on the log of population. 36 The coefficient on population is highly significant for branch density, number of states of bank presence, and salary per employee, suggesting that these quality correlates increase with market size, as the model predicts under endogenous sunk costs. In terms of city-specific effects, the results imply roughly that for a doubling of population size there is a 3.5 times increase in the branch density of the average bank in the market, as well as a $ 2,000 increase in the average salary per employee, and an increase in the geographic coverage.
Using a few other definitions of dominant firm to test whether the results here are sensitive to the particular definition of dominant firm, I find that the above-mentioned relationship between market size and quality is robust to various definitions (results not shown). In particular, following the Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board's definition, a dominant bank is defined as that whose market share is at least twice as large as the share of the second-largest competitor in the market (only 57 banks fall into this category, however), and as alternative definitions, a dominant firm is defined as that with the largest market share in a market (or alternatively, those with the largest two/three market shares). Table 6 shows means for the various components of the measure of quality, for both dominant and fringe firms. Dominant banks appear to provide more branches, which, in turn, have more employees, and they also tend to be more geographically diversified, have been around longer, and pay higher salaries to their employees. 37 To test for the significance of these attribute differences, Table 7 shows the results from estimating quality correlates of bank j in market m as a function of an indicator variable for whether the bank is a dominant firm (in which case the variable takes on the value of one), including MSA fixed effects. All the specifications depict a positive and highly precise coefficient estimate for the dominant firm indicator, suggesting that dominant firms provide a significantly higher level of quality.
38 36 These regressions include MSA income per capita (natural logs) to control for MSA characteristics. 37 While Sutton's model provides some clear predictions about market structure, it tells little about what determines who becomes a dominant firm. The fact that dominant firms tend to be older might suggest the existence of a first-mover advantage into local markets, sustained not only through customer switching costs but also through informational barriers as in Dell'Ariccia et al. (1999) . 38 Results are shown for MSA fixed effects regressions only, given that most banks appear in only one market, and moreover, most attributes are measured at the bank level, so that there is no within-bank In particular, dominant firms tend to have higher branch density, more employees per branch, are older and more geographically diversified. 39 Moreover, after controlling for MSA fixed effects, dominant firms appear to pay salaries that are on average almost $ 5,000 higher than those paid by fringe firms. This is a particularly interesting result if there remains any concern about the potential circularity between the main quality measure here and the definition of dominant firm, as salary per employee should be unrelated to the definition of dominant firm based on market share.
By restricting the sample to only dominant firms, Table 8 Among other quality-related characteristics, dominant firms also appear to serve rural markets much more frequently than fringe firms (80 percent of dominant firms operate in at least one rural market vs. 39 percent of fringe), which might be considered by some customers as a useful service, as well as operate in many more MSAs across the country (89 percent of dominant firms operate in more than one MSA vs. 55 percent of the fringe).
Also, based on a survey of banks carried by the Federal Reserve, larger banks, which tend to be dominant in local markets (as will be seen in the next section), had much higher web site adoption rates since the advent of the internet, especially for web sites with not only informational but transational capabilities as well. 41 market variation. 39 Geographic diversification is measured as the number of states in which the bank operates. However, results are similar for the measure based on the number of MSAs in which the bank has branches. 40 The results are not sensitive to the particular population cutoff, which is simply used here to divide somehow dominant firms into large and small markets. The regressions do not include MSA fixed effects because there is not satisfying variation to include them as most markets have between two to three dominant firms (a few have one only), and introducing over 300 coefficients to estimate does not leave many degrees of freedom given the restriction of the sample to dominant firms.
41 See Sullivan (2001) . Most banks in the survey indicated that the most important factors for delivering
The above findings suggest that the observed market structure cannot be merely explained by economies of scale operating on the technological side. Dominant and fringe banks appear to be different not only in terms of their scale of operation, but also in terms of quality of service, with dominant banks choosing to provide a higher level of quality than fringe firms. The unfragmented market structure that holds throughout various market sizes is apparently sustained by investments in larger networks and better service.
FINDING 3:
The market structure documented earlier is sustained by competitive investments in quality. In particular, the level of bank quality increases with market size and, moreover, dominant banks appear to provide a higher level of quality than fringe banks. Product differentiation is an important aspect of banking products, as evidenced by both the observed variety of bank attributes and the empirical findings. 43 Economies of scale with bank services through the internet were to retain existing customers and to be competitive in the future. 42 True, antitrust regulation might have influenced this outcome, by not allowing mergers that would result with a sole firm holding over half of the market's deposits. Given this paper's definition of "dominant," a lower bound on the Herfindahl index in such a market would be 2500, above the Antritrust Division high concentration threshold of 1800.
Alternative explanations and caveats
43 Dick (2002) finds that various bank attributes other than price enter the consumers' indirect utility for bank deposit services. product differentiation, then, might provide a non-Sutton explanation that could rationalize the data just as well. Yet even under this scenario, one should expect to see fewer firms of each type (dominant and fringe) in smaller markets.
In terms of the endogenous sunk costs measures used here, are they really capturing a vertical dimension of banking services? In particular, the branch and geographic diversification are used as quality correlates for banking services. It is possible, however, that they have a horizontal dimension, as branches and ATMs are located in diverse locations within a market, and a consumer might choose to use a branch because of its location, and do business with that branch only. This issue, indeed, arises in most analyses of product differentiation.
While both aspects might be a relevant part of this bank service, the evidence suggests that the vertical dimension is likely to be more dominant. First, consumer surveys and empirical work provide evidence that the relevant geographic market definition is at the level of the MSA, and not smaller geographic areas. Under the assumption that the MSA definition is the correct one, a bank opening a branch in such market should in theory have access to the choice sets of the consumers of the entire MSA. Second, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the vertical dimension of network size (e.g. branch density and geographic diversification) plays a big role in the consumer's decision [see Dick, 2002] .
It is also useful to envision the conditions under which we should expect to observe something different than that predicted by the endogenous sunk cost model, which has been found to be confounded by the banking data. Given the mixed evidence on economies of scale, without endogenous sunk costs, one might expect to find that the structure of banking markets fragments as markets grow in size.
At worst, the results in this section suggest that strategic interaction in the banking industry is important. The findings, taken descriptively, are not only striking and novel in themselves, but the fact that markets remain concentrated regardless of market size provides insight into the ways banking firms compete with each other.
Competition analysis: Carving out of "neighborhoods" and product markets
The previous sections established that banking markets remain concentrated regardless of market size, and that roughly the same number of dominant banks serve each market, as predicted by the endogenous sunk cost model. This structure, however, is consistent with various models of "localized" competition. One might ask, for instance, whether firms are able to carve out geographic areas ("neighborhoods") or product markets within the relevant geographic market. Using much of the insight provided by Ellickson (2001) in his study of market segmentation for supermarkets, in this section I examine the following:
• whether dominant firms control geographic areas or instead compete head on with each other within a given MSA;
• whether dominant and fringe firms serve different geographic areas within the MSA;
• whether dominant firms carve out a different product market from fringe firms;
• whether there are differences between dominant and fringe firms in terms of prices, costs and performance.
Do dominant firms control geographic areas or compete head-to-head within a given MSA?
While the bulk of the evidence suggests that the relevant geographic market is at the MSA level, one might ask whether dominant firms either segment the market or compete head to head with each other within a given MSA (in the least, this is useful as a sensitivity analysis of the results on market structure to the particular relevant market definition).
For instance, suppose that in a given market, dominant bank A has ten branches. Then another dominant bank B in that market, with ten branches as well, could have each one of them located nearby to bank A's branches, or alternatively, located in very different areas or "neighborhoods" of the MSA.
In order to explore this, each MSA is broken down into cities (or towns) and counties.
There are 8803 cities and 883 counties for the 331 MSAs present in the sample. Cities are rather small sections within the MSA, with an average of 27 cities per MSA. 44 Counties are much larger areas, comprising several cities and towns. An average MSA has between two to three counties. It is worth noting that in the analysis that follows, any reference to dominant or fringe firm refers to the definition provided earlier, done at the level of the MSA. Table 9 That is, if there is one dominant firm in a given area, it is likely there is another dominant firm. This fact is relevant if one believes that competition from another dominant firm is important in curtailing the market power of an incumbent dominant firm. These findings suggest that at various levels of disaggregation within the MSA, dominant banks do not appear to hold distinct geographic areas, and instead seem to compete head on with each other.
Do dominant and fringe firms serve different geographic areas within a given
MSA?
An alternative possibility to market segmentation is that dominant and fringe firms might serve distinct geographic areas within the MSA. This possibility is easily ruled out by the data.
First, most areas have dominant firms overlapping with fringe firms. Monopoly areas, as mentioned earlier, are rare. Areas with multiple firms but with only one firm type represent a small portion (14 percent of cities, and 8 percent of counties), and are mostly served by fringe firms. Moreover, these areas tend to be geographically small, with two to three banks serving them, and one or two branches per bank.
Second, dominant and fringe firms tend to locate their branches near each other. Figure   4 shows the location of each branch throughout the Boston MSA market, which is fairly representative of other MSA markets in this respect. The circles in the figure represent branches belonging to Boston's dominant banks, while the triangles depict branches of the fringe. The amount of overlapping that these two types of banks have all over the MSA is striking: right next to most circles of the figure there is a triangle. This suggests that dominant firms tend to compete with fringe firms very closely, by locating their branches near each other.
The evidence indicates that even at the level of analysis of such a small unit as the city, dominant firms do not appear to be segmenting the market from those of fringe firms, but rather tend to serve the same geographic areas. Indeed, the basic dominant-fringe firm structure documented at the level of the MSA appears to be relevant even within the smaller geographic area of the county.
Do dominant firms carve out a different product market from fringe firms?
This section explores whether dominant firms serve different customers from those of fringe firms. Table 10 shows several balance sheet items for both types of institutions that provide insight into their asset portfolio and product mix.
Loans, commitment lines and time deposits may all be thought of as bank products.
In terms of this output set, one significant difference between dominant and fringe firms is in the proportion of assets allocated to commitment or credit lines (an off-balance sheet item): while dominant firms allocate over 60 percent of their assets to commitment lines, fringe firms dedicate about half of this. Given the nature of a commitment, this might be suggestive of a difference in service quality between the two firm types (emphasizing earlier findings in this paper), as opposed to a distinct product market niche. The central feature of a commitment is that a borrower has the option to take the loan down on demand over some specified period of time. 45 Commitment lines of credit are of great value to a bank's client as it allows her to obtain loans as her funding needs arise, which is a feature especially useful for customers that confront numerous contingencies in their activities.
Another marked difference between dominant and fringe firms is in the proportion of small loans (defined to be less than $100,000 according to the FFIEC form reported by banks to the regulatory agencies). While 13% of business loans and 24% of agricultural loans are small in the case of fringe firms, the proportion of these kinds of loans that are small is negligible in the case of dominant firms. While this could simply be driven by the regulatory restrictions on the loan size that smaller firms can offer, there is, in fact, an extensive literature that documents the focus of smaller banks on lending to small firms, Based on the table, dominant and fringe banks show some other differences as well, but these are not as striking, and are hardly large enough as to suggest distinct niches in terms of 45 Commitments are defined as the sum of unused commitment lines and letters of credit over total loans. Loan commitments are one of the products that make commercial banks different from other competing institutions/lenders such as insurance and finance companies. the product market (even though they are statistically significant, given values of T-statistics shown on the table). In particular, dominant firms allocate a larger portion to commercial and industrial loans, and have lower liquidity as measured by the federal funds and securities holdings. In summary, given the above analysis, dominant banks, who assign a large portion of their resources to credit lines, might appeal more to consumers that need financing on demand, which will tend to be business consumers. Fringe firms might focus more on serving smaller businesses and households, as evidenced by the smaller loan size.
Other differences between dominant and fringe firms
To complement the analysis, I examine differences between dominant and fringe firms in terms of prices, costs and performance. Table 11 shows the various interest rates paid and received by both dominant and fringe banks. 46 Excluding commercial and industrial loans, in which dominant banks might specialize (as mentioned above), dominant banks charge higher interest rates on real estate and loans to individuals (mostly credit card loans), higher fees on checking accounts, and pay lower interest rates on deposits. 47 This could be related to quality differences between the two types of firms, documented earlier in the paper.
Dominant banks also appear to perform much better than fringe banks in terms of accounting profits. As depicted in Table 12 , while fringe banks enjoy a return on equity of 24 percent, with a large standard deviation of 41 percent, dominant banks' profits are highly concentrated around 33 percent. In fact, while the number of dominant firms that are losing money is negligible, many of the fringe firms (over 8 percent) are making negative profits, which explains the higher turnover in the firms of the fringe. Dominant firms also show lower average costs, as evidenced by operating expenses as a percentage of assets, which could be suggestive of the dominant firms' greater operating efficiency. On the other hand, dominant firms might be choosing a higher level of risk, as their credit portfolio has a slightly higher level of charge-off losses in terms of assets.
FINDING 4: Banks do not carve out areas within the relevant geographic banking market, but rather compete with each other closely. However, in terms of the product market, dominant and fringe banks appear to focus on a few different sectors.
Implications for antitrust policy
The analysis of this paper has some direct implications for antitrust policy. The introduction of quality investment in the study of competition alters certain relationships between the number of firms, market concentration and conduct that have been believed to exist by the bank regulatory authorities. also represents an attempt to analyze and measure quality in banking services. Furthermore, the paper sheds light on the empirical finding that larger banks charge significantly higher fees than smaller banks. The findings here indicate that dominant firms, which tend to be large banks, do charge higher fees yet invest more in quality. While it might be presumed that the direct cause of quality is bank size, it appears that quality is the result of banks' competitive investment in endogenous sunk costs, which gives rise to barriers to entry and allows for market structure nonfragmentation with increases in market size. This, in turn, allows those banks that invest more in quality to hold large market shares and become big banks.
The analysis of this paper is also useful in the context of the banking literature, which has relied heavily on the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, and which has also affected the way antitrust analysis is carried out. The introduction of quality in models of banking competition, which this work suggests is important, changes the relationship between the number of firms, concentration and competition. The analysis might aid regulators in identifying the relevant variables of analysis as well as asking the appropriate questions. Adjusted for within-bank dependence standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. A single observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in the market. A dominant firm in a large MSA is a dominant bank with presence in an MSA market with population greater than 500,000. Salary per employee is in thousands. Branch density is number of branches per MSA square mile. Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in the market. Year: 1999. An observation is a bank*market combination. Dominant firms are defined as those who jointly control over half of the deposits in the market. 
